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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to set out the Enron’s demise into the perspective of Corporate and Global
Governance. To accomplish this target, the incremental cash flow model is expanded to give room for
governance issues, while a functional introduction to information sets is developed, including bounded
rationality, asymmetric information, opportunistic behavior, transaction costs and agency problems. Then,
corporate governance is linked to globalization by means of some recent approaches that go beyond a
narrow economic mindset to encompass a far-reaching dynamics. Taking advantage of such background,
the Enron’s story is tracked down over a span of fifteen years since its starting day to its bankruptcy filing.
Leading events are explained from corporate and global governance viewpoints, while an in-depth analysis
is worked out on Enron’s complex game of deception and breach of contracts: the outrageous affiliated
limited partnerships, the lavish pay package to its executives, the involvement with global governance
through the Indian affair and the Taliban connection. It is for the incremental cash flow model to explain
malfeasance with cash flows from assets, and how cash flows to creditors were actually contrived.
Furthermore, to highlight how cash flows were swindled from stockholders and, finally, how Enron made
wheeling and dealing with cash flows on behalf of its managers.
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INTRODUCTION
In January and February 2002, the author was Visiting Scholar at the Center for Corporate
Governance, University of Delaware. In December 2001, Enron filed for Chapter 11 on Bankruptcy
Law in the worst case ever known so far. Delaware is the leading state in America as regards
corporate law and the Delaware Supreme Court is the beacon of distinctive precedents on
corporate governance and law. This was the environment where the decision about writing this
paper came to light. From June to September 2002 the author took, this time as a student, the
course in Globalization given by Professor Carlos Escude in the Master program in Political
Science at the University of Cema. That was the background against which this working paper
came to shape and encouragement was found to keep on researching the subject in the near
future.
In section 1, we provide a non-conventional definition of corporate governance, grounded on core
issues either academics or practitioners currently look upon as topical. Besides, corporate
governance makes the most of North’s institutional approach that seems more realistic and
comprehensive than other alternative points of view.
Section 2 takes advantage of the author’s engagement and research in corporate governance for
the last four years, introducing the incremental cash flow model to keep track of many sources that
nurture conflicts of interest and also to provide with a quantitative method for discussing
discretionary behavior and breach of fiduciary contracts.
It is for section 3 to bridge the gap between corporate governance and globalization, a subject that
has been pervasive and difficult to cope with, each time globalization was narrowed down to flat
economic foundations, what amounts to neglect other powerful dimensions whenever global issues
are at stake.
Section 4 introduces a powerful framework that has been successfully employed for the last twenty
years in Financial Economics, in a broad attempt of leaving aside many of the assumptions in
neoclassic economics that have proved untenable to understand the world and its participants. The
section expands on information sets, bounded rationality, asymmetric information, opportunistic
behavior, agency problems and transaction costs. These tools of analysis are currently being
applied in the realm of Political Science.
Section 5 develops a nurturing case and it will not come as a surprise that Enron itself will stand as
the purveyor not only of the story but the lesson as well. An extensive and detailed chronology will
highlight the main events in the rise and fall of Enron from 1985 till 2002, while corporate
governance remarks will be supplied to each of them. Besides, some particular matters that explain
the company demise will be expanded on at length by means of the incremental cash flow model
and the tools developed in section 4: namely the special purpose vehicles, managers pay package,
the limited partnerships and the role Raptors performed in deceitful corporate practices. Last of all,
the Enron’s affair will be pictured against a globalization background that leads to unexpected links
with global governance and politics.Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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1.- CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
“Corporate Governance” seems to be a growing concern among academics, practitioners,
lawmakers, and company’s stakeholders. This is not a striking point because corporate
governance has to do with ownership, accountability and control, incomplete contracts and agency
problems, performance and incentive design. Since the Berle and Means (1932) well-known book,
the concept went a long step further from the separation of ownership and control that led to the
first widely accepted meaning of corporate governance. It was after distinctive research underwent
by Jensen, Fama, Williamson and Hart, among others, that the subject established itself as a
complex field. A comprehensive survey of these efforts can be found in Shleifer and Vishny (1986).
On the other hand, an encompassing work in comparative analysis of governance structures from
advanced economies is provided by Demirag (1998), while corporate governance in Argentina has
been researched by Apreda (2001c).
It doesn’t seem easy to define “corporate governance” as it always happens with thriving new fields
in which semantics turns out to become loose and tentative. Nonetheless, we can set forth a
functional definition that does not attempt to fix a cut and dried meaning, but provide with useful
guidelines instead.
By Corporate Governance it is meant the field of learning and practice related with the following
subject matter:
o  Ownership structure
o  Company’s Charter and bylaws
o  Board of Directors, Trustees, and the allocation of control rights
o  Managers’ fiduciary duties towards owners, and the allocation of decision rights
o  Creditors protective covenants
o  Changes in the capital structure
o  Conflicts of interest between managers, creditors and owners
o  Accountability to stakeholders
o  Tight budget constraints and short-termism
o  Managers’ performance and incentives
o  Information production and disclosure to markets and stakeholders
o  The role of gatekeepers
o  National and international corporate law, regulations and law enforcement
Remarks:
i) Everybody that is able to hold a claim on the company becomes a stakeholder: owners and creditors are the main
stakeholders, followed by managers, employees, government (taxes and complaints), suppliers (bonding and trust),
customers (quality and conveniences), and communities (labor development and environmental damages).
ii) Gatekeepers are distinctive organizations that safeguard the interests and rights of different stakeholders: auditing
and accountancy firms, investment banks, law firms, market regulators, institutional investors, creditors’ trustees,
NGOs (non-government organizations acting as watchdogs of corporations, markets, regulators) and credit-rating
firms.Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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iii)) Corporate Governance seems an unfortunate misnomer because all organizations, by far, display a governance
structure of one sort or another. Besides, government organizations exhibit complex governance features.
For the time being, organizations in general, and corporations in particular, cannot be isolated from
their institutional contexts. This linkage, suitably labeled “institutional”, has been studied widely for
the last thirty years. Being North (1990) a foremost authoritative source, we are going to quote him
so as to provide an outline of this distinctive point of view:
“Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised
constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human
exchange, whether political, social or economic. Institutional change shapes the way societies
evolve through time and hence is the key to understanding historical change. [ ... ] Organizations
are created with purposive intent in consequence of the opportunity set resulting from the existing
set of constraints (institutional ones as well as the traditional ones of economic theory) and in the
course of attempts to accomplish their objectives are a major agent of institutional change ”
When the study of corporate governance is mapped onto the institutional viewpoint, it can address
some core issues at which alternative explanations fall short of expanding on them in an all-
inclusive way:
a)  What can be said about the ownership and control structure of the firm, its chart and bylaws?
b)  Are there multiple voting rights schemes? What is the structure of the Board of Directors?
c)  How the firm is to be financed and what are the warranties for financiers to be paid eventually?
d)  To what extent the capital structure mirrors the institutions of the country where the company runs its businesses?
Does the firm belong to the common law (Anglo-Saxon countries) or the civil law (continental European) tradition?
e)  What kinds of conflicts of interest arise among stakeholders and how should they be relieved?
f)  How are protected the property rights of creditors and stockholders? How good is the law environment to enforce
contracts?
g)  To what extent the information provided by the firm to owners and third parties is accurate and reliable? What
about the way such production of information is influenced by current accountancy and auditing practices?
h)  What are the incentives fostered by formal and informal institutions so that companies become more efficient and
reputable?
i)  To what extent managers are prevented from plundering owners or creditors?
j)  How good are the covenants that the company pledges on behalf of creditors, owners and other stakeholders?
k)  To what extent a legal framework holding in a country can be regarded as a competitive advantage for companies
willing to invest in that country?
l)  Which is the way capital-flows move around within and between national boundaries? What about the regulations
in capital markets and the money markets across boundaries? Is there a fiduciary capitalism? (The claim for a
fiduciary capitalism is well developed in Hawley and Williams, 1997)
m)  How to prevent companies and managers from creative accounting, money laundering and self-dealing?
n)  Which corporate governance procedures and practices should be enacted so as to avoid rogue states, crony
firms, mafia-partnerships and terrorism linkages, from investing in  corporations and banks through special
purpose vehicles like those that Enron, and so many companies, set up eventually all over the world?
o)  Do good practices in corporate governance pay off? Do they enhance the companies’ value?
p)  What is the relationship between corporate governance and public governance? For last, what about corporate
governance and global governance?Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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2. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INCREMENTAL CASH FLOW MODEL (ICFM)
As the former section put forth, a manifold set of issues and concerns arise from this field of
learning and practice called corporate governance. It seems advisable, therefore, to make use of
some information model that enables either academics or practitioners to keep track of governance
matters. In Corporate Finance there is an organizing framework grounded on cash flows that
certainly comes in handy to this paper’s targets, namely, the incremental cash flow model.
Furthermore, it has already been applied to corporate governance (Apreda, 1999, 2001b, 2002a).
An outline of this approach follows below.
For any company, it holds that its finance providers lay claim to incremental cash flows brought
about by assets along a conventional period [ t ; t + 1 ], usually a month or a year, beginning at
date “ t “ and ending at date “ t + 1 “. That is,
(1)
 DCF t (assets)  =  DCF t (creditors)  +  DCF t (stockholders)
In other words, (1) brings forward that debt holders and stockholders have cash flows rights on the
residual income of any company.
Cash flows to debt holders are usually split down into the following components:
(2)
DCF t (creditors)   =   interest t   +  debt repayment t   +
+  debt repurchase t  –  new debt issues t
while cash flows to be passed onto stockholders exhibit this structure:
(3)
DCF t (stockholders)   =   dividends t  +  stock repurchase t  –  new stock issues t
It can be seen from (2) and (3) that cash flows directed either to creditors or owners are positive
(outflows) unless the company finances itself with new issues; in that case, cash flows become
negative (inflows, from creditors or stockholders toward the company). Debt and stock buybacks,
on the other hand, are positive since former claims are retired and cash flows delivered to
claimants.
Cash flows from assets make up the other side of the coin. Breaking down its main components
results in
(4)
DCF t (assets)  =  D CF t (operations)  –  D CF t (working capital)  –  D CF t (fixed assets)Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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while cash flows from operations are defined
(5)
D CF t (operations)  =   Ebit t   –  taxes t    +  depreciation t
where  Ebitt  stands here for “earnings before interest and taxes”, DCFt (working capital)  for
additions to working capital, and  DCFt (fixed assets) for incremental capital spending. It must be
borne in mind that the ICFM assume that short-term finance is embedded into DCFt (working
capital) since it performs like an incremental current liability, while interest payoffs of short-term
debt get their place in Ebit t , as a matter of course.
Although cash flows from operations (5) measure up free resources after meeting taxes and adding
depreciation charges (which are not actual outflows), it would be nonsensical to distribute (5)
without taking care not only of working capital but capital investment requirements as well. For
instance, we must provision for inventories, receivables and payable accounts so as to cater for
working capital needs in (4). Also, fixed assets maintenance, the selling of outdated or obsolete
machinery, the buying of strategic fixed assets, are all investments that keep the company running
or add up to its competitive edge. A general development of this model is to be found in Apreda
(2002b).
2.1 Application of the Incremental Cash Flow Model to Corporate Governance Issues
Several corporate governance problems arise whenever some stakeholders claim back cash flows
over which they are entitled to but, for some reason, those cash flows are diverted to other group of
stakeholders instead, even with guile, greed or intending to expropriate the claimants outright. For
that reason, the incremental cash flow model (1) has to be shaped up so as to disclose the
prospective sources of conflicts of interest.
(6)
 DCF t (assets; net)  =
=  DCF t (creditors)  +  DCF t (stockholders)  +  DCF t (managers)  +  DCF t (cash assets)
where
o  DCF t (managers): this item means “cash flows to be sent to managers through their pay
packages”,
o  DCF t (cash assets): this item amounts to “changes expected in cash that would not be
required for operations along the period, and also financial assets in the company’s
investment portfolio”.
As these cash flows had been hidden in the left side of (1), this time DCF t (assets; net) will mean
the “remaining cash flows after we leave out both cash flows to managers and cash assets.
It is for (6) to provide a sharp picture of distinctive issues addressed by corporate governance.Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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3.-  GLOBALIZATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
After the Second World War, people witnessed the rise of a global economy whose main hallmarks
were, according to Gilpin (2000), the following ones:
o  Open markets
o  Unrestricted capital flows
o  Pervasive activity and influence from multinational corporations
In this perspective, multinational corporations carried out a decisive bearing in such broad issues
as trade levels and location of economic activities. This understanding comes as an upside,
because allows an easy embedding of globalization in the field of corporate governance. A
downside of this approach consists of a constrained focus on economic development, leaving
aside three distinctive features that have been shaping globalization ever since:
a) a market-led globalization that becomes intertwined with political nested interests;
b) an interstate system plus a composite made up of crony capitalism, mafia partnerships and
mega-terrorism setting up a world-system that depends on a capitalist world-economy and its
security-structure;
c) the growing role of some institutions aiming for a global governance target.
The market-led globalization and the political interests, as Friedman (2000) forcibly argues, is
grounded on three wellsprings of conflicting interests:
o  The traditional balance between nation-states: at present, it encompasses the United
States on the one hand, and the remaining nations on the other.
o  Nation-states and global markets: the latter are led by the Electronic Herd (millions of
investors and dealers wired by means of communication networks) that gathers in the
most important financial centers in the world, places that Friedman called “the
Supermarkets”.
o  Individuals and nation-states: Some individuals can influence markets and nation-states in
more powerful ways than any time before, and that is why they are called “Super-
empowered Individuals”.
Within this standpoint, some corporate governance issues run smoothly, namely global
accountability, tight budget constraints for private and government debtors, investment grade
ratings, debt collaterals and securitization, short-term pressures, and global portfolio diversification.
A more encompassing approach, however, it has been introduced by Professor Escude (1999,
2002a, 2002b), who stresses the sum and substance of the “Postmodern World-System”:
o  A capitalist world-economy
o  A fragmented security-structure with weapons of mass destructionUniversidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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Escude points out the structure of the international system as built up by:
o  An interstate composite that comprises those states that make the rules, those that takes
rules, and “rogue” states that albeit they are not able to spell out rules for themselves, they
are ready to reject those coming from the rule-makers.
o  A dominant newcomer: the mega terrorism.
The advantages of this frame of reference for corporate governance seem manifold:
  i.  The states which make the rules are also those that enjoy the best practices in governance
of private or public organizations, while states that take the rules exhibit a wide range of
achievers, from outstanding to substandard countries (transitional and emergent
economies bearing witness to the latter group). However, the rogue states strike as
counterexamples of what might be understood by good practices in corporate governance.
  ii.  Criminal economic activities, first and foremost money laundering, drug dealing, smuggling
of high-tech weaponry, and global terrorism, find out their way through special purpose
entities allowed by the governance of global companies or the leniency of investment
funds in offshore affiliates (Escude-Zavaleta, 2001).
Finally, an institutional point of view has been undertaken by some scholars trailing behind the
United Nations global governance targets (Scholte, 2000). They highlight the following matters of
concern:
o  Globalization conveys the emergence of a sort of post-sovereign governance, because
states cannot be sovereign in the traditional sense.
o  The rise of supraterritoriality has promoted moves toward multilayered governance, where
regulatory competences are more dispersed across manifold substate, state, or suprastate
arrangements and agencies.
Remarks:
i) The Commission on Global Governance (United Nations) defines Global Governance as “the sum of the many ways
individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which
conflicting or diverse interests may accommodate, and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions
and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either
have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest. […] At the global level, governance has been viewed primarily as
intergovernmental relationships, but it must now be understood as also involving non-governmental organizations,
citizen’s movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital market. Interacting with these are global mass
media of dramatically enlarged influence.”
ii) Among the most important global governance agencies in the world, we can point to the following: IDEA (The
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance) was created by 14 countries; ECOSOC (Economic and
Social Council, UN); IMF (International Monetary Fund); The World Bank; The World Trade Organization; The Bank for
International Settlements; OECD represents industrial countries; UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization).
In Section 5.5, we are going to resume this issue in connection with Enron’s disgraceful story.Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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4.-  UNDERLYING INFORMATION SETS IN THE
BEHAVIOUR OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ACTORS
Financial Economics has been developing an approach based in how the economic agents behave
on the grounds of asymmetric information, bounded rationality, transaction costs, opportunistic
behavior and agency problems. This approach has recently come in handy not only in
Macroeconomics (Drazen, 2000) but also in Political Science (Dixit, 1996). Taking advantage of the
author’s own line of research (Apreda, 2001) applied to corporate governance and financial
economics, we are going to outline this point of view to give grounds on this paper’s subject.
By Information Set for any economic or political actor “ e “ at date “ t “ is meant all the available
information he can assess up to that date.
We denote such set
W W( t ; e )
and the fact that past information up to that date is stored in the current information set can be
translated by the condition:
W W( t – j  ; e )    ˝ ˝    W W( t ; e )    ;      j : 1, 2, 3, ......
It goes without saying that “economic or political actor”(also agent) stands here for either
individuals, groups or organizations.
When an economic actor turns to the cash flow model (1), he is only able to appraise a heap of
expectations that are grounded on his information set at date “ t “. That is to say, (1) is conditional
to the economic actor underlying information set. Formally,
(7)
E[ DCF t (assets) ;  W( t ; e ) ]  =
=   E[ DCF t (creditors) ; W( t ; e ) ]   +   E[ DCF t (stockholders) ; W( t ; e ) ]
In a world without conflicts of interest, stockholders, creditors and managers would agree on (7)
outright. Furthermore, they would likewise assess how cash flows are produced and distributed.
Moreover, all of them would pursue their self-interest, which will help each other to attain their own,
in a sort of anonymously competitive-cooperative enterprise (the invisible hand in the market).
Finally, any of them would regard contracts fully enforceable, costlessly designed and easily
monitored. Unfortunately, this environment has invariably being contested through real world
settings.
Having said that, what the economic or political agent actually reaches at date “ t “ is usually an
imperfect information set:
W W( t ; e )
that conveys five striking features:Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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o  both individuals and organizations get only restrained admittance to any information;
o  two or more parties gain access to dissimilar information sets;
o  any economic or political agent may be enticed into trespassing relationships, contracts or
legal constraints;
o  meaningful usage of information sets cannot be achieved unless the related parties endure
and go through a great variety of costs embedded in their transactions;
o  in many economic or political settings, a special kind of relationship evolves many times
into open conflicts of interest between the parties involved, and being nurtured from their
own information sets (the parties being referred as “principals” and “agents”, the latter
committing efforts and skills on  behalf of the former, who grants payment and incentives
to the latter).
To reach a discerning understanding of these five features, we have to delve into sensible
explanations. They will be, namely, bounded rationality, asymmetric information, opportunistic
behavior, transaction costs and agency problems. (From here to the end of this section, we are
going to profit from an earlier paper where we focused on what we then called “ the brokerage of
asymmetric information “ (Apreda,2001a) ).
4.1.    Bounded Rationality
As for gaining access to information sets, either time or effort spending seems unavoidable.
Bounded rationality refers to the manifold costs that arise whenever the economic or political
actor looks for, finds out, gather, processes, organizes, evaluates, stores, makes meaningful use
of, or trades with information.
It was Herbert Simon (1947) the first to install this subject as academically relevant, giving rise to
the Bounded Rationality Approach. Since models of bounded rationality are grounded on the idea
of scarcity, they deal with human cognition like a scarce resource. Furthermore, deliberation about
an economic decision is also a costly activity in which the decision maker tries to achieve a
balance between the benefits of better decisions and the cost of additional allocation of effort to the
decision-making process. (This topic is extensively developed in Conslisk, 1996).
The main concern with bounded rationality lies on the fact that contracts are in practice not only
incomplete but costly to be designed, monitored and enforced. In other words, drafted contracts
are not able to foresee all the contingencies, courses of actions and their likely consequences.
4.2.  Asymmetric Information
Either economic or political actors, as well as their intermediaries, while exchanging goods and
services among them, or political actors when dealing with their political transactions, they jointly
engage in a twofold process (Apreda, 2001a):Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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o  the actual trade  of goods, services, political trade-offs, contracts, financial securities, or
derivatives vehicles defined upon underlying real goods and financial securities;
o  a virtual exchange of smaller subsets of their information sets so as to bind both parties
within the boundaries of their common knowledge.
This process leads to the issue of asymmetric information. In fact, let us suppose that agent “k”
(the principal: a company owner for instance) is about to offer a contract to “s” (the agent: a
manager for instance). In other words, they exchange compensation granted by “k”  for effort,
proficiency and a fiduciary role promised by “s”. In order to do so, they share information, but only
to a certain extent, as it is shown in picture 1. That is to say:
W W(t ; k)   „ „   W W(t ; s)
Although this feature should not prevent counterparts from rounding off their transactions, a new
development arises. One of the parties may take advantage of non-shared information on behalf of
his own interest to the extent of getting much more from his counterpart than it would have been
the case if that private information had been shared. By the way, this environment is at the root of
almost every matter in Politics.
Asymmetric Information  refers to the advantage one party can enjoy by having different
information than his counterpart, so as to improve either from the trade or the relationship for his
own benefit.
Picture 1 conveys the main idea. Both agents share some information for sure, as we can see in the subset of common
knowledge  W(t ; k) ˙ W(t ; s), but they also have information that remains hidden or non-accessible to each
counterpart. In this case, we can point at two subsets that are private information regions: agent “k” keeps non-shared
information for himself, and the same can be predicated on the agent “s” likely behavior.
Why would the economic or political actors take profit of non-shared private information, rendering
in that way conflict of interests? The answer lies on opportunistic behavior.
4.3.  Opportunistic Behavior
It has been a tenet of Economic Analysis that agents behave so as to fulfill their self-interest (Adam
Smith, 1777). However, this standpoint falls short of explaining what really takes place in down-to-
earth transactions.
But it is when we think that agents perform their goals in a world of future commitments and
uncertainty, that the concurrence of self-interest and the likelihood of breaking promises to deliver
goods, services, efforts or payments in the future, both lead to Opportunistic Behavior.
If one party knew something that the other did not, that party might willingly distort, misrepresent or
not disclose such information on his own benefit, what actually amounts to self-interest with guile.
Opportunistic behavior can follow even without asymmetric information (pilfering and shirking at the
workplace being current examples), albeit asymmetric information often seems a driver for
opportunism.Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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In fact, asymmetric information does provide with advantage to its holder, and explains a lot of
things about market intermediaries (see, for instance, Demsetz, 1968 or Spulber 1996).
Arbitrageurs and speculators, for instance, take profit in markets from their superior information
sets, without necessarily impairing counterparts’ property rights or fostering conflicts of interest.
This example proves that asymmetric information is not a sufficient condition for opportunism.
Smart economic actors playing in the markets grab opportunities and reap the gains of the trade
without becoming opportunistic eventually.
To make precise the boundaries between “smart” behavior of well informed economic actors and
“opportunistic” behavior, Williamson and others add to the latter a further qualification by means of
the phrase “with guile”, that is, the use of clever but dishonest behavior in order to deceive other
people.
Picture 2 deploys the fact that, if opportunistic behavior were to take place, it would come out of the
“private domains“ within those information sets that each actor keeps under wraps:
o  for the economic or political agent “k”, it is  the subset  W(t ; k)  ˙  W C (t ; s), which reads as “ the points in
the information set  W(t ; k) not shared by the set  W(t ; s) ”
o  for the economic or political agent “s”, it is  the subset  W C (t ; k)  ˙  W(t ; s), which reads as “ the points in
the information set  W(t ; s) not shared by the set  W(t ; k) ”.
Summing up, the region where most of conflicts of interest arise consists of both information sets
excluding their intersection. This amounts to what in Mathematics is called the “symmetric
difference set”:
W W(t ; k)  D D  W W(t ; s)   =   [  W W(t ; k)  ˙ ˙  W W C (t ; s) ]  ¨ ¨  [ W W C (t ; k)  ˙ ˙  W W(t ; s) ]
Picture 1
Two parties trade on the intersection of their information sets
W(t ; k)
W(t ; s)
W(t ; k)  ˙  W(t ; s)Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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Remarks:
i) It can be argued that one party may even perform opportunistically in the intersection of both information sets.
Although this event is a likely one, for instance when one party behaves in a stupid way, bounded rationality would rule
out this outcome most of the time.
ii) Mathematical foundations for the structure of information sets, based on rings and algebras of sets, can be found in
Apreda (2000b).
Picture 2 
Parties can take advantage of asymmetric information while trading
Generally speaking, we must bear in mind that some of these single and private subsets may
convey information not relevant to the transaction. It is what remains of those subsets, however,
that nurtures different kinds of knowledge pertaining any trade, as represented in picture 3.
i. Not every piece of information included in the information set of the agent “k” is  actually needed for a
particular transaction. Hence, we can isolate at date “ t “ pieces of information not relevant for the trade:
W(t ; k; irrelevant to the transaction)
ii. Next, useful information for the party but not harmful towards the counterparts interest (namely, know-how,
expertise, professional qualifications, customers and advisers networks, reputation) is found in the subset
W(t ; k; useful to the transaction albeit private)
iii. Finally, useful information for the party, but the sort of w hich conveys impairment or damage to the
counterpart’s interest is included in
W(t ; k; relevant to the transaction; opportunistic; unfavorable to agent “s” )
W(t ; k) ˙  W C (t ; s)
   (private information )
W C (t ; k) ˙  W (t ; s)
W(t ; k)  ˙  W(t ; s)Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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There are four types of opportunistic behavior that have deserved a distinctive concern from
academics and practitioners dealing with financial markets (and later embraced by
macroeconomists and political scientists): hidden action, hidden information, free-rider problems
and signaling. By giving a brief summary of each of them, we would like to stress the fact that they
are powerful devices to impair or even lessen the quality of information sets, preventing reliable
information from spreading over parties, markets, prices and constituencies.
Picture 3 : Irrelevant, useful  and opportunistic subsets in an information set
a)  Hidden Actions
At the root of Hidden Actions lies the problem of the extent to which actions (efforts, behavior,
decision making, performance or tasks to be accomplished) can be observed or monitored.
Therefore, there may be an inducement for one party to keep a likely profitable personal agenda,
leaving for the counterpart to foot the bill. On the other hand, to cope with hidden action seems of
the utmost importance to handle verifiable or measurable variables of performance, that is to say,
variables that can be checked by an independent arbitrator. In the context of an agency
relationship this sort of asymmetric information paves the way to moral hazard. (Prescott,1999)
W(t;k)                              W(t ; k; private information irrelevant to the transaction)
                                      W(t ; k; private information useful to the transaction, albeit private)
W(t ; k; private information relevant to the transaction; opportunistic;
unfavorable to agent “s”)
W(t ; k)  ˙  W  (t ; s)
(common knowledge that
nurtures contracts and relationships)
W C (t ; k) ˙  W (t ; s)
                           W(t;s)Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
14
b)  Hidden Information
At the root of Hidden Information lies the problem of the extent to which relevant characteristics
can be known or screened beforehand by counterparts in any trade. They can be personal or non-
personal. By personal characteristics we mean, for instance, biographical features, professional
qualifications, past experience track, personal skills, and credibility from each party at trade. By
non-personal we point at characteristics found in goods or services rather than in human beings:
quality, maintenance, contents, sanitary conditions, compliance with set standards, packaging,
after-sales service, consistency between what is promised and it is delivered. Hidden information
also means information on some relevant state of nature which can influence the outcome of the
relationship between counterparts in any trade or lasting contract. Faced with a set of feasible
contracts, non-neutral to risk people will select different contracts; this means self-selection or,
from the company’s point of view, adverse selection. In the context of an agency relationship this
sort of asymmetric information leads to Adverse Selection matters. (Cummings, 2001)
c)  Free-riding problems
This sort of problem arises whenever some people would rather profit from information gathered by
others than invest in such information on their own; that is to say, they get a  Free-ride on
somebody else’s effort. Investors who buy or sell only after knowing what dealers with a
longstanding reputation are doing, is a good example. If some investors acquire information that
tells them which securities are undervalued (overvalued) and they buy (sell) these securities, other
investors who have not paid for this information may be able to buy (sell) right along with the well-
informed investors, who don’t reap all the profits they could have done otherwise. Savvy
suggestions on free-riding problems arising in Politics may be found in Buchanan (1975).
d)  Signaling
Opportunistic behavior advises the economic agent to hold back private information whenever he
can obtain greater utility by keeping it secret. But sometimes, plain opportunistic behavior may
encourage the economic or political agent to let the other part know a bit of hidden information,
whenever by doing so he will be able to improve his welfare or get better terms in the transaction.
A Signal is some activity or decision by which the agent claims a certain ability or characteristic.
For instance, education acts as an important signal for human resources departments in
corporations and banks, conveying the message “this person is able of learning, being trained, and
brings with him a distinctive professional qualification”. Signaling by means of market behavior is
well developed in Fremling-Posner (1999).
4.4.- Transaction Costs
The Transaction Costs Approach matches bounded rationality with self-interest-seeking, even to
the extent that rules or contracts might be trespassed on with guile. It also recognizes that any time
economic or political agents behave opportunistically they may disclose information only to their
own advantage, by selecting and distorting it within broad contexts of personal agendas and
agency misdeeds.  Williamson (1996) defines transaction costs this way:Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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“The ex~ante costs of drafting, negotiating and safeguarding an agreement and, more especially, the ex~post cost of
maladaptation and adjustment that arise when contract execution is misaligned as a result of gaps, errors, omission,
and unanticipated disturbances. Also it refers to the costs of running the economic system.”
Nevertheless, to regard the economic agent behavior as the main source of transaction costs may
be misleading, because institutions and technology have a conclusive say in the ultimate size of
transaction costs (North, 1990). Hence, a broader outline should include intermediaries (Spulber,
1999) and also encompass important cost components like trading, information, taxes, financial
and microstructure costs (Apreda, 2000a, 2000b). Lastly, transaction-cost politics in an all-inclusive
perspective is attempted by Dixit (1996).
4.5.  Agency Problems
Agency relationships stand out among the major determinants that shape the structure of any
organization and their distribution of decision rights. They consists of the following features:
o  there are two parties: a “principal” (one or more) and an agent (one or more);
o  the agent commits effort and proficiency so as to work on behalf of the principal’s interest;
o  the principal promises a compensation and incentives for the agent to fulfill his
commitment;
o  the relationship is grounded on a contract, either formal or informal.
A wide variety of sources can bring about problems to this kind of relationship, usually labeled
“agency problems”. Particular stress must be laid on the following sources:
o  Incomplete and costly contracts that arise from bounded rationality and transaction costs.
o  Drafting, enforcement and monitoring tasks that are hindered by asymmetric information
and opportunistic behavior.
o  Ex~post residual agency costs, arising from unexpected agency problems, left out of
ex~ante contracts.
Within for-profit organizations, agency problems are rooted in conflicts of interests among owners,
managers and creditors that evolve from the normal running of the company to the extent of
financial distress (background on this subject in Jensen-Smith, 1985). In the basic setting, we find
the shareholders expecting that their agent managers (officers and directors) service the firm’s
debt and set up a growing residual value for its owners. Creditors, on their own, have lower risks
linked to their property rights than owners. Managers have contractual duties to creditors but
fiduciary duties toward their principals (where the term fiduciary stands for acting on behalf of the
interest of the principal with the same prudence as if agents were promoting their own interests).
But if a company became financially distressed and insolvency threatened, managers’ fiduciary
duties would shift away from value enhancement owed to shareholders, toward preserving value
for creditors. In this environment, corporate assets are regarded as a trust fund for the benefit of
the creditors.Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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5.- CASE STUDY: ENRON
Enron’s demise in December 2001 brought into light an outrageous counterexample on what good
corporate governance stands for. It shook not only the corporate world but the ultimate foundations
of capitalism. At the end of the day, this experience conveys a lesson and sets up a strong claim
about deep changes in practices, regulations and information production.
As this story evolved through fifteen years, we can find many instances in which Enron was
signaling deception and malfeasance albeit the gatekeepers remained stonily lenient, substituting
sleaze, political peddling, and greed, for fiduciary duties, accountability and full compliance with the
law. The damage this shameful case uncovered goes beyond investors and markets, to threaten
core beliefs and values in Democracy, Liberalism and good practices in corporate and public
governance.
We are going to review the main events that took place in this narrative, by means of a series of
exhibits that will run every other page. Each of them consists of two columns, the first one
highlighting the triggers of particular reactions or developments, the second one sorting out their
consequences for Enron’s corporate governance. Meanwhile, in the opposite page to each exhibit,
some distinctive issues will be expanded on so as to understand much better the background
within which Enron’s case will be remembered as an ill-fated tale of crony capitalism and
opportunistic behavior with guile.
5.1. FROM BEING A GAS COMPANY TO BECOMING A DERIVATIVES TRADING
ROOM PLUS A HEDGE FUND
In 1990, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) decided to let Enron and a handful
of other companies profit from largely unregulated energy-trading businesses. Two years before,
Enron had used its political clout to get Congress to exempt it from both CFTC and the Security
and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation and oversight of what had become, in essence, a
publicly traded hedge fund making its own highly speculative investments.(The Economist,
December, 2002). ( Exhibit 1 and 3 )
Technically, hedging with a third party conveys that if the value of the investment goes down, the
outside party will ultimately bear the loss. But Enron exchanged its own stock to a Special Purpose
Vehicle (SPV) in exchange for a promissory note.  For instance, through options, futures or swaps,
the SPV would take on the risk that an internet service provider called Rhythms would see its
stock’s value going bust, by hedging Rhythms stock.
5.2. SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES (SPVs)
SPVs (also called special purpose entity, SPE) are limited partnerships, and they can be omitted
from the company’s consolidated financial statements as long as parties independent of the
company provide at least 3% of the SPV’s capital.  The remaining 97% is funded by loans from
external lenders. ( Exhibit 7 )Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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ENRON MAIN EVENTS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES (Exhibit 1)
Events Corporate Governance Issues
1985
Merger of Houston Natural Gas with Inter
North gave rise to Enron. The deal
integrated pipelines systems to create the
first nationwide natural gas pipeline system.
It begins to work not only in gas, but also in
oil and gas exploration, and liquid fuels as
well.
Incremental cash flows from assets: strategical key point
As Enron’s profitability was dependent on the price of gas it
would take advantage of deregulation in the sector.
Underlying assumption: Fall in prices would follow.
Year end 1985
Revenue: $ 10.2 billion (10% international)
Net Income: $ 125 million (13% international)
Market Capitalization: $ 2.0 billion
61 % Debt / Total Capital
Gas Pipeline: 37,000 miles
1986: Kenneth Lay appointed as CEO and
Chairman. He had been chief executive
officer of Houston Natural Gas.
1987: Enron faces an environment of risky
swings in prices.
1988: First overseas office in England
1988: George W. Bush elected President
of the United States of America
Incremental cash flows: short-term goals and tight
budget constraints
a) Debt reduction (Enron was the outcome of two pipeline
merger and did so by increasing its debt burden)
b) Operating expenses reduction, scale back other business
lines and find growth opportunities.
c) Campaign for changes in federal energy rules to allow
natural gas to be sold on open markets like any commodity.
New business definitions
Develop services that reduce the risks of price swings.
Underlying rationale
a)To take advantage of England’s privatization of power
industry and enter unregulated markets to match its business
in the regulated pipelines.
b) Buy or develop an asset (a pipeline, a power plant) and
then expand it by building a wholesale or retail business
around the asset.
1989
Jeffrey  Skilling  joins Enron, after being
Enron’s consultant for a while.
Carlos  Menem is elected President of
Argentina
Off-balance sheet incremental cash flows and short -
termism
Skilling builds up the future core business at Enron:
a) The company pioneers in the use of management risk
products and long-term contracting structures.
b) Change Enron from a natural gas supplier into an energy-
trading company to serve as intermediary between producers
(natural gas and electricity) and end users.
c) Cope with pressures on Enron’s financial reports and credit
ratings arising out of the “underlying rationale”.Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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Enron transferred its own stock to an SPV in exchange for a promissory note and/or cash. The
SPV would hedge a particular investment in Enron’s balance sheet, by matching it with Enron’s
stock. If prices were up and up, then Enron would not pay on its guarantees. When Enron’s price
fell, the SPV’s value fell too, triggering the guarantees payment, and worsening Enron’s value.
When both assets and stock fell, the SPV would be unable to perform its hedge. Finally, the SPV’s
debt should end up onto Enron’s balance sheet.
5.3. LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS HAD A COMMON FLAW:
  NOT ONE OF THEM WAS TRULY INDEPENDENT FROM ENRON
Let us see some features attached to this financial engineering.
a) SPVs were used to shift poorly performing assets from Enron to these affiliates, that become off-
balance sheet items. $27 billion out of $60 billion had been transferred this way by the end of 1999.
Many big names in Wall Street were involved, as well pension funds and equity investors. To get
assets off its books, a company typically sells them to an SPV, which funds the purchase by
borrowing cash from institutional investors. As a sweetener to protect investors, many SPVs
incorporated triggers that require the parent company to repay loans or give them Enron’s
additional securities if its stock feall below a certain price, or in case credit rating agencies
downgraded its debt. (see example 1)
b) Enron’s engaged at the end of each quarter through lots of deals with SPVs, reversing most of
the deals at the beginning of next quarter, always at a profit for the partnerships. In most cases,
these mechanisms amounted to lease transactions by which an asset was sold to an SPV and later
leased back to Enron, which increased the value of assets while outstripping them for a while from
its income statement. Here comes to light the main rationale, because the creative accounting
allowed Enron to keep safe and sound its investment grade rating.
c) When Enron’s Energy Service division agreed to supply power to a company at a fixed price, it
made optimistic projections that energy prices would fall enough in the future so as to guarantee
Enron a healthy profit. On this ground, it could report the expected profit as soon as it signed the
contract. The accounting rule required Enron to mark-to-market the value of its energy trades. If the
market is active, then you can get prices. When there is no such market, companies must resort to
fair values figured out by means of financial valuation models. Enron excelled both at devising
model values and keeping them under wraps to market analysts, regulators and institutional
investors. ( Exhibit 5 )
d) Blockbuster Deal: Enron set up a partnership called Braveheart, raising $115 million from a bank
in exchange for a promise of most of the expected earnings from the deal for some years, as well
as other money that would come from outside investors; finally it put some of its own stock at
stake. If earnings were not enough for the bank, Enron promised that it would repay the balance to
the bank. Afterwards, it reported the whole transaction on a mark-to-market basis, discounting
future cash flows to get an up-front income, albeit a virtual one. In this way, it recorded $110 million
as flat profit. But prices plummeted and, very soon, Blockbuster left the deal. ( Exhibits 8 and 10 )Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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ENRON MAIN EVENTS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES (Exhibit 2)
Events Corporate Governance Issues
1989
Skilling launches Enron’s Gas Bank
Hidden action and information in the incremental cash
flows from assets
a) It is a program under which Enron buys large volumes of
gas from producers and resells it to industrial customers on
long-term contracts, locking in supplies at fixed prices,
stabilizing the US gas market.
b) Besides, it offers financing for oil and gas producers.
1991
a) India: it faces global changes
b)  Argentina: it launches deep economic
changes, privatizations and deregulation.
Global governance and funding
a) The World Bank suggests India to open up to foreign
investment in oil and power plants.
b) The World Bank approves loan to privatize Argentina’s oil
and gas companies.
1992
a) Bolivia: a gas privatization program
b) Argentina: gas business
c)  India: signs with Enron a memorandum
of understanding for Dabhol’s power
project, the largest deal in the country’s
history (worth $ 30 billion over its lifetime).
William J. Clinton is elected President of
the United States.
Global governance and funding
a) The wave of deregulation and privatizations makes sense
for an expansion of Enron’s businesses in emergent
economies. The World Bank finances Bolivia privatization
program.
b) Argentina receives $25 million from OPIC in insurance
over next four years to Enron’s pipeline, Transportadora de
Gas del Sur, which partially acquires.
c) In 1992, a World Bank’s report highlights adverse financial
impact of the Dabhol’s project on the Maharashtra State
Electricity Board.
1992
a) Enron starts taking disguised loans as
hedging for commodities and trading
resources. By doing this, it keeps the loans
off-balance sheet.
b) Funds provided by JPMorgan Chase,
Citigroup and Credit Suisse First Boston.
c) In practice, Enron also becomes an over
the counter derivatives trading firm.
Opportunistic behavior through investors’ deception
and creative accounting
a) If Enron had disclosed the money as debt, credit ratings
agencies and industry analysts would have known that it  was
riskier than it seemed to be, hence downgrading the company
outright.
b) The loans were set up mainly as prepaid swaps, by which
banks give an up-front payment forecasted from future
expected cash flows, and Enron was to repay for a fixed
number of years. (It amounts to a synthetic loan). Another
vehicle was a loan to be repaid in two years, contingent on
changes in the price of oil.
c) Enron recorded these transactions as “assets from price
risk management” and “liabilities from price risk
management”. Although the accounting treatment was done
within accounting recommendations for prepaid swaps,
procedures became secretive and deceptive.Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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e) Example 1 provides a simplified diagram to explain how a SPV works when the parental company sold
assets to the limited partnership.
EXAMPLE 1: ASSET SALES THROUGH AN SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITY
Stage 1
      Enron sells the asset to SPV
Stage 1
         SPV delivers cash to Enron ($30 million)
and a promissory note ($70 million)
Stage 2
   With money from investors
  LMJ2 repurchases the promissory note
       
  Enron’s stock as loan collateral
   (or contingent contracts
    for delivery of its own stock)
Stage 2
     97% lending to SPV
         Stage 3
                SPV pays principal and
interest to outside lenders
Stage 2
      Outside investors deliver cash flows
Stage 3
    They receive a contractual set yield
ENRON
In June 2000 Enron sold LJM2
excess fiber-optic connections, at a
value of $100 million. (actual value
$33 million, making a virtual profit
of $67 million)
Enron recorded sales proceeds
were recorded as income. The
inflated price over excess fiber-
optic connections would set a new




directed by Fastow and other
Enron’s managers.
It records a loan in its books
OUTSIDE LENDERS
Outside lender put 97% of funds
required by the SPV.
OUTSIDE INVESTORS
They supply 3% of funds needed
by the SPV (this is a regulatory
requirement)Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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ENRON MAIN EVENTS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES (Exhibit 3)
Events Corporate Governance Issues
1993
a) Guatemala:  Puerto Quetzal Power Co.
b)  Philippines: Batangas and Subic Bay
Co.
c) Venezuela: natural gas business
d) Trinidad-Tobago: projects in oil and gas
development.
The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission grants Enron an exemption
from reporting requirements in electricity
contracts.
Global governance and funding
a) A Guatemalan company was set up by Enron and when an
increase in rates up to 100 % was enacted, political crisis
ensued and President Serrano fled the country.
b) In the Batangas concern, Enron has ownership and
receives OPIC $30  million support.
c) US Export-Import Bank, Coface (France) and Sace (Italy)
provide $290 million for natural gas premises, in which Enron
has 50 % of the stake.
d) In Trinidad-Tobago, Enron has 95 % ownership and
receives $100 million in insurance from OPIC.
(Wysham-Vallette, April 2002)
Political peddling and sleaze
The Federal agency was chaired by Wendy Gramm, the wife
of Senator Phil Gramm, who was a well-known recipient of
Enron’s political money.
1994
First electricity trade contract
a) Dominican Republic: power stations
b) Colombia: Promigas pipeline project
c) India: Dabhol power plant would cost $3
billion.
d) Turkey: power plant
e) Philippines: Batangas Power plant.
A new profit center
It is a likely concoction of the Risk Management Division
Global governance and funding
a) The World Bank invests over $200 million in Power and
Pipelines in Dominican Republic.
b) The World Bank provides $30 million to Promigas.
c) Indian project is financed with $600 million by OPIC and
Ex-Im (guarantees and financing). Belgian, Japanese and
Indian banks furnished additional financing. The State of
Maharashtra gives Enron a guarantee “to indemnify and keep
the company against any loss sustained or incurred by the
company by reason of the invalidity, illegality or
unenforceability of the deal”. In a counter-guarantee to Enron,
the Republic of India stakes all its assets (including those
abroad, save diplomatic or military) as surety for the
payments due to Enron.
d) Enron owns 50 % of a power plant, and OPIC agrees on a
loan up to $295 million.
e) OPIC and the Asian Development Bank provide $76
million to Batangas.Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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5.4.  HOW “RAPTORS” PLAYED UP DECEPTION
To hedge its profits, Raptors were created as investment entities, furnished with Enron stock and
stock options eventually. Raptors issued promissory notes to pay back and committed to hedge for
the value of emerging companies whose stock Enron owned. Money to Raptors came from SPVs,
which funded themselves with institutional investors and banks. ( Exhibit 8 ) Should the price of
emergent companies stock fell, Raptors make it up for the decrease so as to protect SPVs and
their creditors. In Enron’s books, Raptors performed as an independent speculator providing
hedging.
Enron made use of its own equity value to counteract declines in the value of certain of its
merchant investments, thus preventing losses from being recorded in its income statement but
diluting stockholders value. To accomplish this, Enron entered into derivative transactions with the
Raptors, a sort of accounting hedging. If the value of the merchant investment declined, the hedge
would increase by an equal amount, and this could prevent the income statement from disclosing
any loss. But it was not an actual hedge, with a third party ready to assume the risks of a decline in
investments. Instead, Enron and LMJ2 created the raptors, ending up with only an internal risk-
hedging architecture, by means of transferring Enron stock (or contracts to receive Enron’s stock),
to the SPV and at a discount of market price. As long as Enron’s stock kept its value, the Raptors
could stand ready to pay for the hedging.  All this procedure goes against accounting
principles: a business may not recognize gains due to the increase in the value of its capital
stock on its income statement. When the value of Enron’s merchant investment fell in late 2000
and early 2001, the Raptor’s liabilities with Enron grew, but also fell Enron’s stock, impairing
Raptors to honor the hedging eventually. That’s why Enron had to terminate Raptors and disclose
in October 2001 more than $500 million charge after taxes, and an amazing shareholder’s
reduction of equity by $1.2 billion. ( Exhibit 5 )
We are going to outline two kinds of limited partnerships as used by Enron, albeit many details
about them remain unclear so far. Besides, Example 2 provides with an exhibit that outlines what
was taking place with raptors and SPVs.
a)  In 1997, Chewco is designed to keep off Enron’s balance sheet a distinctive merchant
investment, the Joint Energy Development Investment (JEDI).
From 1993 to 1996 Enron and Calpers (California Public Employees’ Retirement System), were partners in a $500
million joint venture investment partnership called Joint Energy Development Investment Limited Partnership (Jedi).
Jedi was not consolidated in Enron’s financial statement because it was shared with Calpers. In this way, gains and
losses were recorded in the income statement, but it did not show Jedi’s debts. Calpers put $250 million in cash and
Enron in its own stock only.
In November 1997, Chewco came to light in order to allow Calpers to leave the partnership paying $383 million to
close the deal. Chewco finances the purchase of Jedi’s interests with debt with two banks giving Enron stock as
collateral. It did not record the deal in Enron’s books, not even complying the rules of non-consolidation in SPVs. AsMr.
Fastow was a Senior Executive running Chewco he appointed a close friend of his, Mr. MichaelKopper (director of
Enron Global Finance) to lead the project, with an initial personal stake of $125.000, earning more than $2 million as
management fees from 1997 to 2000. When in March 2001 Enron repurchased Chewco, Kopper received more than
$10 million. ( Exhibit 5 )Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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ENRON MAIN EVENTS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES (Exhibit 4)
Events Corporate Governance Issues
1994
July:  Bolivia-Brazil pipeline.
Global governance and funding
Enron won a public bid to partner with YPF Bolivia the
construction of the Bolivian side of the pipeline. The
incumbent president, Gonzalo de Lozada started
negotiations with Enron five months before the date, but
only leaving other bidders 13 days before deadline. In
December 1994 the contract was signed in New York
between Sanchez de Lozada and Enron, utterly illegal
under Bolivian law. Enron was allowed to set up an
international offshore company dodging Bolivian taxes. In
first quarter 2002, a Congress committee began to
investigate these deals, and was told by the government
that the contract has disappeared. Besides, Enron has
committed environmental negligence and likely crimes.
1995
Enron’s division in Europe establishes a
trading center in London.
President Carlos  Menem gets reelection in
Argentina.
a) Dominican Republic: power stations.
b) Turkey: power plant.
Wholesale Business
Enron enters the European wholesale markets.
Global governance and funding
a) Enron acquires 50% of World Bank ownership in the
power plant.
b) OPIC supplies $295 million to Enron’s investment.
1996
a) Argentina: gas pipeline.
b) Bolivia: World Bank loan to pipeline.
c) China: power plant.
d) Colombia: Promigas plant.
e) Panama: Bahia Las Minas power plant
California  deregulates the state’s power
sector.
Global governance and funding
a) The Argentine southern gas pipeline wholly owned by
Enron and the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation.
b) Bolivian pipeline runs from Bolivia to Brazil. Enron is a
major shareholder to which OPIC will lend further.
c) The power plant is run by Enron. The guarantee comes
from the World Bank.
d) World Bank extension of $35 million to Promigas.
e) Enron’s plant Las Minas gets guarantee from Export-
Import Bank to Bank of Boston for financing sales of gas
turbines.
( Wysham-Vallette, April 2002)Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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EXAMPLE 2:  A RAPTOR STRUCTURE TO HEDGE ENRON’S MERCHANT TRANSACTIONS 
$41 million      Put option purchased to Talon by Enron
                 premium on a
            put option to
     100 % ownership      the Raptor in
       of subsidiary case LJM2
were not paid
by the Raptor
       Stage 2
                  It receives from Raptor
                  a membership interest
Stage 2
LJM2 invests $30
million cash in the
new partnership
         Flow 2          Flows and counter flows        Flow 1 Fair market value put
                on Talon interest
ENRON
The first Raptor was set up in April 2000 and called Talon, with the advise of Andersen
and the law firm of Vinson and Elkins. Its purpose was to provide hedging to Enron for
up to $ 500 million in notional value, taking advantage of the embedded value of its own
stock to counteract declines in the value of its merchant investments.
LJM2
a) It performs as the manager of the Raptor.
b) This partnership would receive from Raptor
income, and before the SPV entered any
hedging, a fair market value put option on the
membership interest to the SPV of $41 million.
RAPTOR 1 (SPV)
(Talon)
It was restricted from selling, pledging or hedging
the Enron shares for three years. The shares
were valued at about  35% discount.  Enron acted
as a bank, underwriting the purchase, making
accounting hedges, with debatable prices.
Credit capacity: the raptor could absorb losses in
derivatives up to $217 million (it comes from $30
million given by LJM2 plus $187 million of Enron
stock and contracts (35% of $537 million)
ENRON WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARIY(HARRIER)
Flow 1.-  Enron’s contribution to Harrier and Harrier’s contribution to Raptor:
$1,000 cash   +   $ 50 million promissory note  +   Enron Stock  +
Enron’s Stock contracts with a fair market value of $537 million
Flow 2. -  Raptor contribution to Harrier:
Membership interest  +   Promissory Note $ 400 million
Flows and counter flows: derivative transactionsUniversidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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ENRON MAIN EVENTS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES (Exhibit 5)
Events Corporate Governance Issues
1996
India: construction of Dabhol power plant in
India starts, after being signed in 1994 but
delayed by political concerns.
President William J. Clinton gets reelection.
Global governance and funding
The project amounts to $3 billion and faces domestic
political problems and rampant corruption allegations from
scratch. OPIC supplies guarantees needed by Enron’s in
oil and gas field development.  Riots and strong criticism
tarnishes the company’s reputation. In 1995 the State of
Maharashtra filed suit in the Bombay High Court seeking
cancellation of Dabhol’s contract on grounds of fraud,
corruption and misrepresentation. In May, the new
government signs a counter guarantee on behalf of Enron.
1997
Jeffrey Skilling appointed as President.
Skilling builds up the Energy Services
Division and The New York Mercantile
Exchange awards Skilling for Global Vision in
Energy.
Incremental cash flows from assets
Shift from an asset-based pipeline and power generating
company to a marketing and logistics company.
Information production and disclosure to markets,
regulators and stakeholders
Lou Pai is appointed as divisional CEO and starts using
mark-to-market accountancy (and reporting virtual profits
when the contract was signed, on 10-year assumptions
about future energy prices and use, although the money
would not come in for years, if ever). This is a debatable
information disclosure technique to profit from deregulation
of electricity markets. Its mission will consist of providing
energy management services to customers.
1997
a)  Brazil launches the liberalization of its
energy markets.
b) Gaza Strip: power plant .
c) Indonesia: gas power plant.
Scalpers’ interest in JEDI bought by Enron.
Global governance and funding
a) Enron’s Bolivia-Brazil project gets $1billion from
Japanese, European and multilateral banks. Enron gets the
utility Elektro (Sao Paulo), paying $1.3 billion.
b) OPIC and World Bank furnish $37 million in a sensitive
area.
c) Java plant is guaranteed by World Bank in favor of
Enron’s investments.
Breach of fiduciary duties by the Board of Directors
Full approval of the buy out.Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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b)  LMJ1 and LMJ2: They allowed Enron to increase its financial reports in at least $1 billion.
LJM1, LP, Cayman (June 1999), allowed to create an SPV called Swap Sub that was used as a counterpart for
hedging transactions with put options (rights to sell stock) in order to protect Enron’s operations with Rhytmus, a
privately held internet service provider.
LJM2,LP (October 1999), was used to build up four SPVs as counterparts to hedge transactions with merchant
investments. Outside investors put $349 million in LJM2, which invested millions of dollars in the Raptor partnerships,
under the promise of at least 30 percent return. ( Exhibit 7 )
Enron lent $1.2 billion of its stock to Raptors partnerships, promising to issue more stock if the value of Raptors’
investments fell, thus insuring the solvency of partnerships. Raptors issued promissory notes. Raptors invested in
some of Enron’s assets, power plants and pipelines. When asset values and stock prices fell, Enron has to provide
more of its own stock to keep the partnership solvent. However, issuing the more, the bigger was dilution against
former stockholders.  From 1999 through June 2001, Enron entered in more than 20 distinct transactions with the LJM
partnerships, some of them intended to sell assets, while the remaining ones to hedge transactions.
5.5. A BLESSED CASH COW FOR INSIDERS
Enron devised a complex executive payment package that became a tangled web of fraud and
deception in the managers’ hands. From a corporate finance point of view, any such package is to
be regarded as a portfolio of cash, financial assets and derivatives. The main components in this
portfolio, and their monetary weights, for year 2001, were made known in the files to the
bankruptcy court ( Exhibit 12 ). The information includes packages enjoyed by 144 executives
(including Lay, Skilling and Fastow).

















base salary, cash allowances, benefit payments
annual cash incentives on performance
multi-year (3 to 5 years) on key market drivers performance
stock option or phantom stock arrangements
due to termination of employment or in-service withdrawals
promissory notes with option to repay with Enron’s stock
severance, consultancy, relocation costs (also abroad)
business expenses reimbursement , fees for consultancy
cash payments and value of stock grants to non-executives
value in excess of exercise price, in cash or stock swap
gross fair market value of shares and accrued dividends
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ENRON MAIN EVENTS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES (Exhibit 6)
Events Corporate Governance Issues
1998
a) Brazil: Elektro and Bolivian pipeline
b) Panama: it launches the privatization of the
power sector.
c) Venezuela: natural gas extraction
d)  Dominican Republican: privatization of
the public sector
e) Argentina: Enron International Argentina is
granted the first power marketer license in
that country.
Enron acquires Wessex Water in the United
Kingdom.
Global governance and funding
a) OPIC grants $200 million in Elektro, and $200 in the
Bolivian pipeline from Santa Cruz de la Sierra to Cuiaba,
Matto Grosso, Brazil. Enron’s partner is Royal Dutch/Shell
Group.
b) International Finance Corporation finances the
privatization process. Enron purchases 51% of Las Minas.
c) OPIC provides $400 million to Enron’s facilities.
d) The World Bank gives a loan to Dominican Republic to
privatize its power sector.  Enron gets a large share in the
power business, and after taking over, power rates
increased up to 50 %.
e) The license allows buying and selling electricity. The
company can offer physical delivery of energy
commodities, financial energy products and risk
management service to commercial and industrial
customers. The Inter-American Bank provides Enron with
$375 million to finance the pipeline system.
Subsidiaries
With this purchase, it grounds the water subsidiary Azurix.
It pays $2,2 billion.
1999
Broadband business is launched. Investment with misleading assumptions
a) “The market for bandwidth intermediation will grow from
$30 million in 2000 to $95 billion in 2004” Enron Annual
Report.
b) Bandwidth Trading: The capabilities as energy merchant
would be easily applied to this trading line.
1999
Enron Online is formed as a commodity
trade Internet site.
May: Azurix-Argentina gets water and
waterwaste concession in Buenos Aires
province, for 30 years.
Online businesses
It quickly becomes the largest in the world, to become the
cash cow in the group, but nobody outside the division
knew what it was going on. (In 2000 processed more than
$335 billion of transactions).
Global governance and political peddling
It pays $438,6 million, and there was strong political
criticism. It also invest in water utilities in Brazil and
Mexico.Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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Going deeply into the information, we can see those of top executives Lay, Skilling and Fastow, in
contrast with the whole lot of 144 executives. It should be borne in mind that Fastow’s main income
was coming from the limited partnerships with which he was involved as general manager, and
information on that income is still unclear to this date.













































































Taking advantage of the market’s boom in the 1990s, Enron’s executives and directors had been
selling $1 billion worth of shares since 1998 ( Exhibit 12 )
5.6. THE INCREMENTAL CASH FLOW MODEL AND ENRON’S GOVERNANCE
In section 2 we dealt with the incremental cash flow model, which has turned out to be the
customary tool in valuation any time we want to assess the value of companies, investment
projects, and financial assets in a ever growing field of applications. Furthermore, it has recently
been used to focus on corporate governance issues (Apreda 2001b, 2002a). Now, we are going to
draw some understanding of Enron’s infringements and misdeeds by means of this cash flow
approach.
o  Firstly, we need an extension of this model as put forth by (6), allowing for cash flows
delivered to managers, and also the company’s portfolio on financial assets investment. As
regards the manager’s side, their particular items follow the details reported by Enron in
the bankruptcy files submitted to courts.Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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ENRON MAIN EVENTS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES (Exhibit 7)
Events Corporate Governance Issues
1999
Azurix goes public
Enron becomes the largest and most
innovative natural gas company in the USA.
a) Colombia: concessions and privatizations
plan.
b) Panama: Bahia Las Minas power plant.
c) Dominican Republic: power plant
Ownership changes
Azurix goes public on a third of its equity, but shares did
not perform as expected.
It engages in gas, electric and communication businesses.
Fortune calls Enron “the America’s most innovative
company” for the fifth time.
Global governance, funding and political peddling
a) President Pastrana meets in October with Texas
Governor George Bush Jr., and important oil and gas
executives, including Enron’s, to discuss concessions and
privatization in the sector.  In December, two congressmen
are ousted for alleged bribes from Enron.
b) World Bank provides guarantees to Enron’s investment.
The company rises rates and people refuse to pay; power
is shut off and rioting ensues. Fraud claims alleged.
c) Enron gets a large slice in power business, but rises
rates so much that riots ensue, and they go on worse after
rolling blackouts follow. Eight people killed by riot police.
1999
Enron’s CFO, Andrew Fastow, with full
approval of the Board, established LJM
Cayman LP and LJM 2 Co-Investment LP,
two Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV). Fastow
becomes general partner.
Outside Investors in SPVs: Citicorp,
American Home Assurance Company,
American International Group, Morgan
Stanley, Travelers Insurance.
Head of Risk-Management team at Enron’s
against SPVs.
Gatekeepers: Board oversight and acquiescence with
limited partnerships:
a) The board passed a waiver of the company’s conflict of
interest rules.
b) The stated purpose of these limited partnerships was “to
hedge the fluctuating market values of Enron’s assets”.
c) The real purposes were hid speculative losses Enron
suffered on technology stocks; huge debts to finance
unprofitable new businesses (retail energy services); inflate
value of troubled business in fiber-optic bandwidth.
d) As early as in 1997, the Board received detailed briefing
on limited partnerships, approving aggressive accounting
actions, including moving debt off the company books.
Asymmetric information and lack of accountability
Vince Kaminsky warns that risk hedging with SPVs was
bad and dangerous. Skilling transfers him out of the risk-
management division “because he was acting like a cop,
killing deals”. (Behr-Witt, their series at The Washington
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What this set of relationships convey is that managers always enjoy an amazingly wide latitude
whenever they have to assess, allocate and hide ex~ante cash flows. On the other hand, bounded
rationality and asymmetric information explains how advantageous the managers’ side really
becomes, preventing investors and stockholders from distinctive and functional information.
Moreover, as witnessed by corporate scandals spanning along the last months, regulations
appears to be seriously flawed and lenient for the time being. Therefore, deep changes in capital
markets oversight, as well as accountancy and law practices, should be enacted outright.
In the case of Enron, managers played what Fuller and Jensen (2002) have recently denoted “the
earnings game”, by which they tried, by hook or by crook, to keep earnings and value growing, so
as to meet the analysts expectations and the investment grade rating. And the only way to perform
this game of deception was the outright manipulation of future expected incremental cash flows.
o  Secondly, it seems useful to single out the main components shown above to give account
of the opportunistic behavior of Enron’s managers. This is accomplished throughout four
exhibits that feature in more detail how to track down prospective malfeasance by following
the sources and uses of future expected changes in cash flows from assets, in contrast
with cash flows toward creditors, stockholders, and those funneled into managers hands
and cash-assets portfolios.
THE INCREMENTAL CASH FLOW MODEL IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
1. Incremental Cash Flow Model
DCF t (assets; net)  =
=  DCF t (creditors)  +  DCF t (stockholders)  +  DCF t (managers)  +  DCF t (cash-assets)
2. Cash Flow to Managers
DCF t (managers) =  ( Salary in cash  +  Performance Bonus  + Deferred Income +
+ Long Term Incentive  +  Deferral Payments  +  Loan Advances  +  Other  +  Expenses +
+  Director Fees  +  Exercised Stock Options  +  Restricted Stock  +  Restricted Stock  Deferred)t
3. Cash Flows kept within Cash-Assets Portfolios
DCF t (cash-assets)  =  cash not for operations t  + short-term financial assets portfolio t  +
+  medium-  and long-term financial assets portfolio t  +  fair present value of derivatives portfolio tUniversidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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ENRON MAIN EVENTS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES (Exhibit 8)
Events Corporate Governance Issues
1999
CFO’s Magazine gave Fastow an “Excellence
Award in Capital Structure Management for
his pioneering work on unique financing
techniques”.
Free-riding, window-dressing, and gatekeepers
as partners-in-crime
More than 40 lawyers from Vinson and Elkins played their
role in designing, structuring and reporting of various
partnerships leading to structured finance methods.
(Cunningham, 2002)
2000
April: It is created the first Raptor, an Special
Purpose Vehicle (SPV), to help hedging
transactions with Enron. Arthur Andersen
billed Enron $330.000 for its engagement at
designing the SPV.
Enron let know that is playing in many fields
in profitable ways.
Stock appreciation up to 60 %.
Highest price Enron’s stock: $90 in August.
At Davos, Switzerland, Lay described Enron
executives as “guerrillas fashioning bullets out
of ideas”.
Breach of good practices code on conflicts of interest
It will be later found out that Fastow cashed $30 million as
partner in SPVs.
Empire building, hidden action
and risk transfer with guile
a) Enron Transportation Services: market marketer and
merchant for the trading of energy; gas and electricity.
(Wholesale)
b) Enron Energy Services: it provides outsourcing services
to manage energy to customers (Retail)
c) Enron Broad Band Services: it sells broadband
communication capacity (Wholesale)
2000
a) Nigeria: power project
b) Venezuela: natural gas plant
George Bush Jr. declared President by the
Supreme Court.
Global governance and funding
a) Nigeria government offers Enron a subsidy to start
project.
b) Ex-Im Bank sends $65 million so as to help Enron’s
Venezuelan investment.
2000
Annual revenues reach $100 billion (more
than double the year before) mainly because
the increase in the trading line of business.
The value of the company was nurtured by
transmission business (9%), wholesale (52%),
retail (39%).
July: Enron announces a 20-year deal with
Blockbuster to deliver broadband services
(video on demand to consumers’ homes over
the Internet).
Moral hazard, adverse selection and free-riding
Year end 1999 (Bodily-Brum, 2002)
Revenue: $ 40.1 billion (25% international)
Net Income: $ 893 million (36% international)
Market Capitalization: $ 50.5 billion
48 % Debt / Total Capital
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THE INCREMENTAL CASH FLOW MODEL AND THE ENRON’S CASE (1)
 Box 4
 Box 3 Box 1
MALFEASANCE  WITH  CASH  FLOWS  FROM  ASSETS
D DCF t (assets)      =     D D CF t (operations)  –  D D CF t (working capital)  –  D D CF t (fixed assets)
Box 1
Cash Flows from Assets
While this item went on increasing period after period, the
company pretended there was value enhancement.
Furthermore, an amazing lack of checks and balances by
the Board of Directors came as a matter of course.
Box 2
Cash Flows from Operations
Enron designed the SPVs
to make up its income
from virtual operations,
as if it were actually
selling goods
or services to the market.
Box 3
Cash Flows from Working Capital
The Risk Management
Division, by  hedging operations,
and taking short-term loans from
banks, it kept inflows
increasing by hook and by crook.
Box 4
Cash Flows from Fixed Assets
By means of assets sold to
limited partnerships close to the end
of financial reporting periods,
this item furnished more virtual
inflows to cash flows
from assets.
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ENRON MAIN EVENTS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES (Exhibit 9)
Events Corporate Governance Issues
2000
Andersen collects $52 million as fees from
Enron. (consulting fees: $27 million; audit
fees: $25 million)
Argentina: Azurix-Buenos Aires investment
meets problems.
August: Citicorp issues Credit-Link Notes from
this date to May 2001, amounting to $1.4
billion. (Altman, February 8, 2002, The New
York Times)
Gatekeepers:  conflict of interest
For the last ten years, a growing concern in the market and
regulators had spread over the issue of audit firms like
Andersen that engaged themselves in consultancy roles
Global governance and funding
Angry population complains bad quality in water supplied
by Azurix, and there are increasing financial problems
between the government and the company.
Covenants in bonds harmful to stockholders
a) Citigroup offered five year notes to investors under the
label of credit-linked notes. They were issued by
companies incorporated as trusts. Investors received fixed
payments on the notes, and Citigroup invested the
proceedings in government and corporate top rate
securities.
b) It nothing wrong came up, Citigroup returned the
principal to investors. Otherwise, even if Enron went
bankrupt, they would receive Enron’s unsecured debt from
Citigroup loans, while Citigroup would keep the highly rated
securities instead.  In this way, investors should settle their
grievances in the courts, directly with Enron.
December: Congress fosters deregulation
in derivatives markets.
December: California power crisis
Clinton’s Energy Department bans Enron
from trading in California. In January 2001,
the day after Inauguration Day, Bush’s
Energy Department reverses Clinton’s order
(Palast, The Observer, March 8, 2002).
( Exhibit 10 )
Institutional Environment and Governance
After powerful lobbying, big companies in the energy
business like Enron get a deregulated status for
derivatives, by means of the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act, that allowed them to fell into a
regulatory black hole.
Hidden action and information, political peddling:
Incremental cash flows from assets manipulation
a) It increased artificially demand, by shipping more energy
than needed and later selling the excess at a profit.
b) Phantom power transfer, being paid to scheduling
transmission out of congested lines, without actually
moving energy.
c) Megawatt laundering, by shipping back to California as
imported electricity previously bought in the same state at
a profit.Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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THE INCREMENTAL CASH FLOW MODEL AND THE ENRON’S CASE (2)
CONTRIVING  CASH  FLOWS  TO  CREDITORS
D DCF t (creditors)      =       D D CF t (interest)      +     D D CF t (debt repayment)
+   D D CF t (debt repurchase)  –  D D CF t (new debt issues)
Box 1
Cash Flows to Creditors
While this item was kept within bounds period
after period, Enron was able to profit from a
good investment risk grade.
Box 2
Interest and Debt Repayment
By means of limited partnerships and
cooking the books, Enron was
dealing with off-balance sheet
interest and repayment debt.
( Exhibits 2, 9, 12, 13 )
Box 3
Debt Repurchase
This became a blurring item as from 2001 when some liabilities
from failing limited partnerships hit rock bottom and had to be
embedded with Enron’s consolidated financial statements.
Box 4
New Debt Issues
In fact, new debt amounted to junk bonds
issuances, but gatekeepers, namely
analysts and credit rate agencies granted
investment grade to Enron’s bonds.
Box 1
Box  3 Box 4
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ENRON MAIN EVENTS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES (Exhibit 10)
Events Corporate Governance Issues
2001
a) January: George Bush Jr. is sworn in as
President of the United States.
b) January: California power crisis
c) Pressure on Californian government
February: Skilling takes over as CEO while
Lay remains as Chairman.
Public and corporate governance
a) Enron heavily contributed to political campaign:
From 1990 to 2002, Enron gave $5,8 millions to candidates,
and three quarters of that money went to Republicans.
b) Rolling blackouts in California because rates increase by
266%. Enron and other companies blame to power
shortages, albeit there is no such thing.
c) Governor Davis agrees with power producers to lock in
$43 billion in power purchases over twenty years to balance
rates and avoid blackouts. ( Exhibit 9 )
2001
a) February, March and April: Lay meets
with vice-president Cheney, who is alleged
to have submitted directions on how to run
the energy policy in the country
b) Vice-president is also blamed on
boosting pending projects in India.
March 5: “Included in the $126 a share that
Enron says it’s worth is a $40 a share (or
$35 billion) for broadband. Several of
Enron’s analysts value broadband at $25
(and congratulate themselves for being
conservative)”. Adding later that “but for all
the attention that’s lavished on Enron, the
company remains largely impenetrable to
outsiders.”(Fortune)
March: Enron and Blockbuster’s deal falls
through.
Skilling gets the “Number 1 CEO of the
United States Award”.
Global governance and political peddling
a) Cheney uncovers the national energy plan after holding at
least six meeting with Enron’s executives.
b) In April, Secretary of State Colin Powell meets India’s
Foreign Minister Singh, hinting that Dabhol’s failure would
amount to lose investors confidence. And in June, Cheney
raises the issue with Sonia Gandhi, on behalf of Enron.
Gatekeepers failure and breach of fiduciary duties
a) Law firm Vinson and Elkins had not found any wrongdoing
for the last ten years. Vinson and Elkins has been one of the
most important contributors to both Bush presidential
campaigns.
(Bodily-Bruner, 2002)
b) Arthur Andersen did not warn Enron about any of its
dubious accountancy procedures.
c) Some market analysts voiced their worries about Enron’s
partnerships (did they hide debt?) and Fastow’s role (did he
know Enron’s share were overvalued?)
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THE INCREMENTAL CASH FLOW MODEL AND THE ENRON’S CASE (3)
SWINDLING  CASH  FLOWS  FROM   STOCKHOLDERS
D DCF t (stockholders)      =       D D CF t (dividends)      +     D D CF t (stock repurchase)    –
   –  D D CF t (new stock issues)
Box 1
Cash Flows to Stockholders
While this item went on increasing period after period, the company
was not issuing stock to meet any real investment project or reorganization
process. The target was to make stock available to fulfill limited
partnerships requirements and stock options granted to high executives.
Box 2
Dividends
In fact, Enron never paid good dividends:
a) Dividends paid per common share: 0.50 (2000) ;
 0.50 (1999); 0.48 (1998); 0.46 (1997); 0.43 (1996);
b) while the closing price for stock in NYSE was
83 (2000); 44 (1999); 28 (1998); 20 (1997); 21 (1996).
c) In 2001, Enron restated earnings for 1997-2001
( Exhibit 13 )
Box 3
Stock Repurchase
Several executives, starting with Lay,
took loans from Enron and they were
repaid with Enron’s own stock.
Box 4
New Stock Issues
Increasing the stock, Enron fulfilled
two purposes: a) to meet lavished
stock option programs their
executives enjoyed; b) to comply with
limited partnerships hedging
requirements.




Box 2 Box 3Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
37
ENRON MAIN EVENTS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES (Exhibit 11)
Events Corporate Governance Issues
2001
April: From 1999 to the first quarter of 2001, price
risk management grew to $22 billion from $60
billion in assets and liabilities. It received from
banks almost $4 billion in loans under the guise of
hedging price risk.
a) Nigeria: Problems with Enron in Lagos plant.
b) Dominican Republic: political turmoil because
of Enron’s policies.
Free-riding problems,
and lack of checks and balances as well
Since 1997 Enron’s stock increased more than 370 %
but while Skilling was CEO (six months period) the
share price busted (from $80 in January to $43 in
August) because failures in the broadband business
and international power projects (mainly in India)
Global governance and funding
a) The government accuses the company of secrecy
and bad faith in contracts enforcement. The World
Bank helps the plant, and also grants a loan to
privatize Nigeria’s power, telecoms, air transport and
water utilities. Enron sells Lagos power plant to AES.
b) It is disclosed that power assets were sold at least
$1 billion below actual value and the auditor comes to
be Arthur Andersen. The government accuses Enron
of fraud and blackouts.
2001
June: Brazil power plant
July: Fastow ended his participation in the main
SPVs.
August and September: Pressure on India.
Global governance and funding
OPIC provides $190 million loan guarantee to Enron’s
Brazilian power plant.
Global and corporate governance, political
peddling
a) In July, Christine Rocca, in charge of Central Asian
Affairs, USA Department of State, meets Indian
government to discuss Enron investments.
b) In August, American ambassador Blackwill holds a
meeting with Indian government on behalf of Enron’s
affairs. Lay writes in Financial Times that India would
be cut off of any aid in case the government
expropriated Enron’s premises.
c) In September, the World Bank is asked to express
concern over Enron problems in India. On September
9, senior officer at OPIC sends a report to Cheney
suggesting some talking points with oncoming
meeting with Foreign Minister Singh. (The
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THE INCREMENTAL CASH FLOW MODEL AND THE ENRON’S CASE (4)
ENRON:  WHEELING AND DEALING WITH CASH  FLOWS
FROM   ASSETS, CREDITORS AND STOCKHOLDERS
D DCF t (managers)     +   D DCF t (cash-assets)    =
=    D DCF t (assets; net)      –   D DCF t (stockholders)    –   D DCF t (creditors)
Box 1
Cash Flow to Managers
DCF t (managers) =  ( Salary in cash  +  Performance Bonus  +
Deferred Income +  Long Term Incentive  +  Deferral Payments  +
Loan Advances  +   Director Fees  +  Exercised Stock Options  +
Restricted Stock  +  Restricted Stock  Deferred + Other  +  Expenses)t
To keep the managers on a tight rein, the package not only rewarded
managerial skills and performance but also compliance with a company’s
culture of malfeasance and hiding.
Box 2
Cash Flows kept within Cash Assets Portfolios
DCF t (cash assets)  =  short-term financial assets portfolio t +
+ cash not-for-operations t  +  fair present value of derivatives portfolio t  +
+  medium- and long-term financial assets portfoliot
Black holes in capital markets regulation, as well lenient accountancy and law
procedures, allow companies to mismanage these items, investing in
substandard projects, taking off loans from financial statements, marking-to-
market virtual gains, or outright empire building, political peddling and sleaze,
(to the extent of buying dustbins for Enron headquarters made of marble,
because it signaled a commitment with excellence…)Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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ENRON MAIN EVENTS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES (Exhibit 12)
Events Corporate Governance Issues
August 14:  CEO and President of
Enron (Jeffrey Skilling) resigns
regardless of losing a $19.9 million
severance package. Ken Lay takes
over as CEO while being
Chairman.
August 23: Bond Analyst Scotto,
from BNP Paribas, lowered Enron’s
rating.
September 11: Terrorist attack to
World Trade Center in New York
and Pentagon building in
Washington.
Asymmetric Information and Accountability
Wall Street starts claiming more disclosure of financial statements
and performance.
Anti-market behavior
Enron complained about Scotto’s report and BNP puts the analyst  on
family leave and fired him in December
September:    Azurix crumbles Global Governance and Azurix investments
Water utilities in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and England accused of
supplying water dangerous for health, while financial shortcomings
come to light. Enron announces it would be selling Azurix
investments in those countries. Azurix CEO, Rebecca Mark resigns
from Azurix and Enron’s Board after selling 1.8 million shares of stock
for about $81 million.
September 28:
JPMorgan-Chase’s Deal
Pictured as a hedge to protect
against rising prices in natural gas.
Enron got $350 million of
incremental cash flows. Far from
being a hedge, it was a covered
loan.
JPMorgan argued that the bank
had recorded the transaction
according to regulations linked with
“structured finance”.
Leakage about inside sellings
Incremental cash flows to creditors and hidden transactions
a) Chase paid Mahonia, an offshore company in Channel Islands,
$350 million, to be repaid on March 26, 2002, plus a floating
components contingent on natural gas futures contracts.
b) Mahonia lends Enron the money, under the same contractual
covenants.
c) Enron agrees on September 28, to pay Chase $356 million on
March 26, 2002, in return for a payment equal to the floating payment
owed from Mahonia to the bank.
(Enron actually paid to the bank a loan rate of 3.4%)
d) It was another transaction intended to increase earnings and hide
debts.
e) JPMorgan Chase total exposure to Mahonia in this one and former
deals amounted to $1.1 billion.
(Altman, February 17, 2002, The New York Times)
Conflicts of Interest and Inside Dealings:
Skilling sold shares for $30.6 millions; Ken Lay for $16.1 millions; Lou
Pai (former Chairman, Enron Energy Services) for 33.6 millions; Ken
Rice (former CEO Enron Broadband) for 14.7 millions.Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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5.7. THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE ISSUE
To raise the question whether corporate governance has any linkage with global governance might
have been sounded farfetched, to say the least, throughout the Cold War period. But in the called
post-modern world (Escude, 2002a, 2002b), not only seems feasible, but necessary.
After the OPEP pushed on oil prices in 1973, a huge cost-structural inflation spread over the world,
stirring up a growing concern around the developed countries. The challenge was about finding the
means of weakening their dependence from Arabic countries. It did not came as a surprise that
some global institutions, mainly the World Bank, were taking big steps toward huge investments in
oil and gas. In 1981, President Reagan set up policies requiring, for a country to qualify as a World
Bank loan recipient, that it should start privatizing and deregulating the oil, gas and power domestic
market. It also included the involvement of officials in the US Commerce Department, State
Department, and Energy Department, to advise governments and also meet politicians in the target
country. In some cases, these became sound measures to pursue, but utter failures in others. In
fact, some companies did extremely well, without blemish and much praise to draw from their
involvement, but other multinationals tarnished their reputations, infringed human rights, damaged
the environment and endeavored in crony capitalism practices.
This was the environment that Enron took advantage of, becoming global and seeding the roots of
its own demise. But this was not the time of “global reach” that many multinational corporations had
enjoyed for decades, as those in the oil or the grain business, where the bulk of the task and effort
rested on the companies shoulders. Now, the globalization in a post-modern world required
the joint effort of global governance provided by interstate agencies and the corporate
governance afforded by the company itself.
The process by which interstate institutions masterminded their role can be briefed this way: the
World Bank (and soon other agencies) began to issue loans to help privatizations and deregulation
in developing countries. In a second stage, bidders from the private sector would apply to purchase
the going concerns. Sometimes the bidder became the only owner of the former state-owned
company. But in other cases, it would need leverage to round up the whole amount of money to be
invested in the privatization. At that juncture, the World Bank would provide with the additional
finance. In a third stage, the foreign company that was running the new company, might undertake
additional investment projects so as to meet contractual covenants signed when the privatization or
deregulation took place, or to enlarge the scope of the business outright. Here, the company was
able to apply for more funds, bring new partners or ask interstate agencies for insurance of political
risk. ( Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 11 )
Extensive research (Wysham-Vallette, April, 2002, and Vallette, August, 2002) disclosed that five
statements stand out on evidence about the Enron’s involvement with overseas operations during
more than a decade in almost 30 countries:
o  Overseas direct investment would not have been feasible for Enron, unless huge finance and political clout
had been provided by interstate agencies.
o  The World Bank was the largest creditor of Enron’s projects abroad, second to OPIC. From 1992 to 2001, it
gave Enron almost $1 billion.Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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ENRON MAIN EVENTS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES (Exhibit 13)
Events Corporate Governance Issues
2001
October 18: The Wall Street
Journal matches write-offs with
partnerships designed by Enron
CFO Andrew Fastow.
Internal Report requested by the
Board of Directors.
Prudential’s analyst advises to
short Enron’s stock.
India: Political involvement with
Enron’s investment.
Conflicts of interest
“Vexing conflict-of-interest questions” said the paper, and it added
”Enron repurchases 55 million of its shares that it had issued with an
investment vehicle ran by Fastow”. (WSJ, October 18)
Board of directors audit: The Powers Report
The committee was chaired by W.Powers, who was the dean of the
University of Texas Law School and member of Enron’s Board. The
Report was released in February 2002, with severe indictments on
Enron’s accountancy procedures.
Gatekeepers Conflict of Interest
But for Prudential, the remaining analysts kept advising to buy
Enron’s securities.
Global and corporate governance
a) Undersecretary Larson meets with economic officials in India
government so as to foster November 9 meeting between Bush and
the Indian Prime Minister.
b) Larson ask OPIC senior investment officer to write down some talk
point to be used in November 9 meeting between Indian Prime
Minister and President Bush.
November 1: Enron discloses that
Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase
gave $1 billion
November 8:  Enron restates its
own earnings for 1997-2001.  
November 9: Indian Prime Minister
visits Washington.
Incremental cash flows to creditors and off-balance transactions
It was a line of credit to “supplement short-term liability and refinance
maturing obligations”.
Deceitful auditing practices: incremental cash flows model badly
applied for more than four years
The main grounds for restating earnings were:
a) “Financial statements for these periods and the audit reports
relating to the year-end financial statements for 1997 through 2000
should not be relied upon”
b) To correct accounting errors
c) To consolidate three-off balance sheet entities that Enron and its
auditors might have been included
d) To disclose Andrew Fastow’s involvement with partnerships.
Global and corporate governance
Bush is prevented from dealing with Dahbol issue while meeting with
Prime Minister Vajpayee.Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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o  It turned out that through taxpayer’s contributions, US government agencies disbursed $3.4 billion in support
of Enron’s international business. Main financiers were: The US Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC), the Export-Import Bank, and the US Maritime Administration Trade and Development Agency.
Besides, it should be added the non-monetary involvement of these agencies in advisory, lobbying, public
and institutional support.
o  Even if the above-mentioned agencies or the World Bank regarded untenable the project, there were
chances for Enron to get money through the Commonwealth Development Corporation (United Kingdom),
the European Investment Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. ($3 billion)
o  OPIC gave Enron not only financing but political-risk insurance for foreign projects.
5.7.1.  ENRON INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS
THE INDIAN DABHOL POWER PLANT AND THE OIL-TALIBAN ISSUE
Dabhol’s investment in India became hazardous for Enron, because the company was in great
need, from an early stage, of getting cheap gas to fuel the plant. Firstly, it was thought that
liquefied gas from Qatar would come in handy, but later it turned out to be a very expensive energy
source for the Indian consumer to foot his electricity bill. Enron owned 65% of Dabhol, the
remaining stock were in the hands of Bechtel, General Electric and the Maharashtra State
Electricity Board. In May 2001, Dabhol was almost finished, but the construction was halted mainly
because a cheap source of natural gas was not available at the time. Moreover, the government
faced trouble to meet contractual payments to Enron. ( Exhibit 3 and 5 ).
It’s worth remembering at this point that in 1996 Unocal (a leader energy resource and project
development company) got a contract to build a long oil and gas pipeline to exploit Turkmenistan
natural gas fields. It would extend from the Afghanistan-Turkmenistan border, through Afghanistan,
crossing the Pakistan border and ending in Multan, Pakistan. To accomplish this huge investment,
Unocal signed an agreement with the Taliban government and also their foes, the Northern
Alliance for the pipeline to be built across Afghanistan. The project allowed for an extension from
Multan to New Delhi. Unocal had the controlling power, but the company was a consortium whose
other members were Saudi Arabia’s Delta Oil Company, and groups from Japan, Korea, Indonesia,
Pakistan and Turkmenistan. On the other hand, Halliburton, a company that had been managed for
many years by Vice-president Dick Cheney, would have constructed the pipelines eventually.
To tighten the surprising linkage the first two paragraphs actually conveyed, it must be said that as
soon the Soviet Union crumbled and fell down in 1989, the United States started to nurture the idea
of controlling the Central Asian oil and gas pipelines, because it was not only cheaper (the Russian
charged very highly to let their own pipelines to be used) but would cut down on his dependency
from the current Persian-Arabian Gulf sources. Besides, profiting from the new international order,
Washington could foster American companies to bid for businesses and deal face to face with new
countries that sprout in the Caspian basin after the Soviet Union demise.  Between 1991 and 1997,
big companies (Unocal, Shell, Texaco, BP Amoco) became involved with the state of Kazakhstan,
setting up expected further investments that would amount to $35 billion.Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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ENRON MAIN EVENTS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES (Exhibit 14)
Events Corporate Governance Issues
2001
December 1: The Economist calls
Enron “a hedge fund with a pipeline
on the side”.
December Sunday 2:  Enron filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection.
Almost $50 billion in assets, the
largest bankruptcy in history
overriding Texaco’s bankruptcy in
1987, with $36 billion in assets.
Discretion with Enron’s stock-
options distribution among high
executives mean changes in
ownership structure when those
options are exercised.
December, Monday 3: More than
4000 of Enron’s headquarters
employees were let go.
December 5: Wall Street Journal
attacks Enron’s Culture of Secrecy.
Gatekeepers Leniency:
Moody’s Investor Service, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch granted
“investment grade” to Enron up until a few days before bankruptcy.
And failed to highlight discrepancies between reported earnings and
retained earnings. Even worse, they did not perform cash flow and
debt analysis.
a) Enron’s Estimated Debt (in billions):  $40
Balance Sheet:
To Banks   $4
To Bondholders $9
Off-Balance Sheet Transactions
To Banks  $3
To Bondholders $17
Other Debt Instruments $1






c) Some big stockholder groups losses
Retirement Systems of Alabama ($48 million)
Arizona State Retirement System ($35 million)
University of California Retirement Plan ($145 million)
Florida Retirement System ($306 million)
Employees Retirement System of Georgia ($127 million)
New York City Pension Funds ($109 million)
Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio and State Teachers
Retirement Systems ($115 million)
Teachers Retirement System of Texas ($59.7 million)
State Investment Board of Washington ($69 million)
Damage to stakeholders:
Each employee received $4500 severance pay.
(Vinod, 2002)
Culture and Organization Failures:
“A culture of highly questionable financial engineering, misstated
earnings and persistent efforts to keep investors in the dark.”Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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As for Enron’s involvement with the Caspian basin, it must be born in mind that in November 1996
had got a contract in Uzbekistan to explore gas fields, giving up the project after Gazprom, the
Russian pipeline company, overcame the whole project. In February 1999, Enron won a contract to
lead a technical research about the feasibility of a trans-Caspian gas pipeline project to be run
among Turkmenistan’s government, and the American companies Bechtel and General Electric.
The study was paid by the US Agency for Trade and Development, under Clinton presidency and it
cost $750,000. Enron’s advise was to follow an earlier project, through Afghanistan. ( Exhibit 7 )
In August 2001, the Bush government tried to settle down a deal with the Taliban government so
as the pipeline project were set into practice. The signature of this contract might have avoided the
Enron collapse. At the end of August, negotiations between American officials and Taliban
counterparts went sour, mainly because some Taliban demands were not met by the United States
(namely to reconstruct Afghanistan’s infrastructure and to open the pipeline to local consumption).
On September 11, Taliban protected terrorists struck a heavy blow in New York and Washington.
On December 31, 2001, Bush appointed Zalmay Khalizad, former Unocal consultant and Taliban
defender as special envoy to Afghanistan. In February, he was acting as Special Assistant to the
President and National Security Council member on post-Taliban affairs.(Callari, February 8 and
28, 2002) ( Exhibit 10 )
According to a highly reviewed article published in Albion Monitor, February 28, 2002, it could be
likely that Enron’s CEO Ken Lay would have enjoyed the inside track with the American
negotiations with the Talibans representatives in August 2001, and regarded the whole deal as the
bail-out that so badly needed Enron for the time being. Failure with the Taliban option led Enron’s
CEO to trust in the American pressure on India government that could have allowed him to resell
Dabhol in $2.3 billion, as an alternative solution. In fact, in August, Lay writes in the Financial
Times that India would be cut off of any aid in case the government expropriated Enron’s premises.
To add insult to injury, on September 14, 2001, Lay threatened Indian Prime Minister in a letter
where he said that $2.3 billion price “was reasonable because they Enron had a legal claim of up to
$5 billion”. ( Exhibit 3 and 11 )
Filing for bankruptcy on December 2, 2001, Enron’s top executives knew that their company was at
the end of the road, while their game was over.Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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ENRON MAIN EVENTS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES (Exhibit 15)




January: Amalgamated Bank, a
union bank which manages
pension funds, filed a suit against
Enron executives
January: Allegations of misdoing
and blame
a)  Mozambique’s steel factory
project given up
b) Bolivia-Brazil: Cuiaba Pipeline.
February: The Power Report to the
Board is released.
New CEO appointed to cope with
the reorganization of the firm.
a) Sherron Watkins warned Lay in August 2001 about accounting
malfeasance within Enron. (“I am incredibly nervous that we will
implode in a wave of scandals)
b) Maureen Castaneda disclosed that shredding of compromising
files began after Thanksgiving in Houston headquarters.
Incentives and Inside Information
The bank alleged that the last four years Enron’s executives and
directors earned $600 million selling the company’s shares they have
received as incentives under the guise of stock options.
The Gatekeepers:
SEC: it  lacked will and resources to research in the Enron files
submitted
Securities Analysts: they relied on SEC files and were slow to warn
investors to sell. They were in most cases inside traders.
Andersen: failed to audit according to law, accountancy principles
and fiduciary duties. Destroyed core information with guile.
Global Governance and Funding
a) Enron had planned to invest $1.1 billion in the project to build up a
natural-fueled factory to produce steel slabs. It was the only
confirmed shareholder in the project.
b) OPIC cancels any additional loan to the Cuiaba natural gas
pipeline.
Accountability and Gatekeepers
“In virtually all of the transactions Enron’s accounting treatment was
determined with the extensive participating and structuring advice
from Andersen, which reported to the Board”. (The Power Report)
As time goes by, some scholars regard the gatekeepers failure at the
root of Enron’s malfeasance. Investors and employees found out that
reputational intermediaries breached their fiduciary contract towards
them. (Coffee, Understanding Enron: It’s about the Gatekeepers,
Stupid, Columbia Law School, 2002)
Reorganization under the Bankruptcy Law
Stephen Cooper is appointed CEO at Enron to proceed with the
company’s reorganization. He had spent more than 25 years
restructuring and rehabilitating troubled businesses.Universidad del Cema                                         Working Paper Series,  Number  225                                           Author: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
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6.- CONCLUSIONS
To the extent that a company becomes global, its corporate governance must keep up with this
stage. At that point the company will run around with financial suprastate agencies, governments,
politics and crony capitalism practices as well. To the extent that a company gets involved with the
most innovative trends in the markets, a strong pressure from analysts, investment banks and
credit rating agencies will corner the company’s managers to perform only for the short term and in
pursuit of their personal agendas. Opportunistic behavior might provide with an ill-advised
response to that global reach and sustainable growth stubborn demand. This is why corporate
governance cannot be left on the sidelines.
By taking advantage of the incremental cash flow model, this paper expanded on distinctive
corporate governance issues that went wrong with Enron. By developing the main features of
economic and political actors when they handle their information sets, it is possible to understand
the pervading influence that bounded rationality, asymmetric information, opportunistic behavior,
transaction costs and agency problems carry on the daily running of any business.
When linking corporate governance with global governance, complex and dangerous matters arise.
In the Enron’s tale, sleaze and political peddling were the vehicles chosen to back the managers ‘
pretense that the company was going to excel forever. Global agencies disbursed millions of
dollars to enable Enron to expand all over the world in unsuccessful projects in contempt of law. At
last, employees, pension funds, institutional investors, banks, emergent countries communities and
their governments, all of them were unfairly called to foot the bill.
The main lesson to draw from this narrative, lies on the accountability problem. Whereas Enron will
have to face the music in several courts of justice, this disgraceful tale of malfeasance uncovered
the ultimate actors that should be blamed for: the gatekeepers. They neglected their fiduciary role
and damaged the credibility of many institutions and practices either in corporate or global
governance. To raise the standards in accountability remains an unsettled issue and the task to
address in the future on behalf of corporate life, democracy and stakeholders.
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